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## FROM BALCONIES TO TANKS: POST-JUNTA CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN GREECE

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*This article analyzes the reasons why praetorianism in Greece has not been followed by more of the same, as appears to be the case in most states that have experienced military rule. After a careful examination of the available data, it was concluded that having learned their lesson, both the civilian and military elites have played a role in keeping the armed forces away from the levers of political authority, the civilians by following carrot and stick policies designed not to encroach on the military's corporate interests, and the armed forces by accepting the view that they can best protect their corporate interests by staying in the barracks. The continuing disputes with Turkey have also helped in that they have reinforced the positions taken by the civilian and military leaderships.*

There seems widespread agreement among scholars of civil-military relations regarding the posture of the military in countries that have experienced praetorian rule. The prevailing view among scholars is that the aftermath of praetorianism is more of the same (Nordlinger, 1977:207; Feit, 1973:23; Finer, 1962:110-139). As a result, little effort has been made to deal with the civil-military relations of the handful of nations whose armed forces withdrew from politics and made room for sustained civilian rule characterized by widespread popular representation in governance. Nordlinger and Welch, who each have briefly dealt with this subject, conclude that this not so pervasive phenomenon is the outcome of lessons and experiences derived by both the military and the civilian leadership of the countries concerned. The difficulties the armed forces encounter in ruling tend to curb their appetite for overt political power. On the other hand, intervention and military rule teach civilian incumbents that tampering with the armed forces' corporate (professional)<sup>1</sup> interests triggers powerful interventionists motives (Nordlinger, 1977:208-210; Welch, 1976:313-327). Corporate or professional interests refers to adequate budgetary support, institutional autonomy, protection against encroachment from other institutions, and the viability and survival of the armed forces as a social organization (Nordlinger, 1977:65-78).

While welcome and insightful, these scholarly works deal only with generalities and offer very little by way of specific and in-depth analyses of countries that have moved from praetorianism to sustained civilian rule. However rare, this phenomenon is of considerable importance and deserves some

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1. Military professionalism is defined here in terms of (a) specialized theoretical knowledge accompanied by methods and devices for application; (b) responsibility, grounded on a set of ethical rules; and (c) a high degree of corporateness deriving from courses, training, and devotion to specific doctrines and customs. See Bengt Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalization and Political Power* (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage Publications, 1972), p. 15.



attention. The aim of this study is to fill a small portion of this void by looking at contemporary Greece where a seven-year praetorian rule (1967–74) was succeeded by a civilian-dominated regime characterized by popular representation, competing political parties, and a still young but regularized pattern of political succession. The country just entered a second decade of uninterrupted civilian rule highlighted by two presidential successions and three electoral contests, the last of which (1981) catapulted to power Andreas Papandreou and his party, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK). Papandreou and his party in the 1960s represented the very forces whose ascent the military sought to prevent by staging a coup d'état in April 1967 (Danopoulos, 1980:Chapter 3).

This article, then, seeks to identify the reasons that have prevailed upon the Greek military to remain in the barracks since their hasty return in 1974; analyze the nature of civil-military relations during the last decade; and assess the role of military professionalism<sup>2</sup> in maintaining civilian rule in Greece. For purposes of clarity and classification, the time-frame under study is divided into three separate periods: the transition period covering the first six–seven months following the disengagement; the remainder of the Conservative New Democracy party's stay in office (October 1981); and the first three years of Papandreou's Socialist government.<sup>3</sup>

### THE TRANSITION INTERLUDE

On July 23, 1974, the Greek armed forces, after more than seven years in power (*heptaetia*), decided to return permanently to their prescribed role and to obey the orders of the elected leadership. The disengagement came at the heels of a failing effort on the part of the military rulers—commonly referred to as the Junta—to cloak their regime with a mantle of legitimacy (Danopoulos, 1983). This failure prompted the more hard-line elements within the Junta who, led by Brigadier Dimitrios Ioannidis, sought the overthrow of the president of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, in an effort to create a climate of national emergency, hoping that it would stimulate a groundswell of popular support in favor of their

2. Military professionalism in Abrahamsson's use of the concept is shaped by two levels of adaptations, macro and micro. By macro he refers to elements that operate in the larger political system, such as technological innovations, recruitment procedures, and socio-economic considerations. Micro, on the other hand, ascribes to internal socialization components, such as education and interaction with colleagues. Hence, the characteristics of military professionalism, "at a given time," is "a function of both processes." Bengt Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalization and Political Power* (Beverly Hills, Ca.: Sage Publications, 1972), p. 16.

3. This paper is partly based on personal interviews with eighteen military officers and twenty-five civil servants conducted in Athens by the author in the summer of 1982. As always, Greek bureaucrats and army officers showed reluctance to speak on the record and to have their names revealed. The interviews were conducted in bits and pieces and in different places and times, which makes it almost impossible for the author to provide systematic details regarding the timing, circumstances, and method for selecting interviewees. In spite of these difficulties, however, the author is satisfied that the interviewees spoke their minds and the information they revealed constituted true statements of their beliefs and experiences.

4. There were three distinct groups or tendencies within the "revolutionary council": (a) "the parenthesis closers," (b) the middle grounders, and (c) the hard-liners or Kadafides. For details see Theodore A. Coulombis, "The Greek Junta Phenomenon," *Polity* 6 (Spring 1974), pp. 345–374; and Constantine P. Danopoulos, "From Military to Civilian Rule in Contemporary Greece," *Armed Forces and Society*, 10:2 (February 1984), pp. 235–236.



faltering regime. But instead of becoming what the praetorian rulers bargained for, the Cyprus debacle proved their epitaph (Danopoulos, 1982).

The decision of the Greek military to disengage from the levers of authority in July 1974 was dictated by the following professional concerns: pressure from military officers outside the government who viewed return to the barracks as the only way to salvage the armed forces' image and the institution's long-range corporate goals; the devastating impact of the Cyprus debacle; and tactical volunteerism on the part of the hard-liners who felt temporary disengagement would pave the way for a comeback (Danopoulos, 1984).

The new civilian regime of Constantine Karamanlis inherited a demoralized and internally divided military; the Turkish occupation of Cyprus resulting from the ill-fated adventure by the Greek praetorian regime; diplomatic isolation; and a multitude of domestic problems. The new government moved with determination, deliberate speed, and caution to tackle the nation's problems. The ongoing Cyprus crisis was by far the most immediate problem the new government had to come to grips with. Having very few options available, the Karamanlis national unity cabinet accepted a truce and agreed to take part in the Geneva conference, both of which were hastily arranged through American and British mediation efforts.

In a position of advantage, Foreign Minister Turan Günes of Turkey demanded that his Greek counterpart recognize the *de facto* division of Cyprus in two geographic zones. Foreign Minister George Mavros protested, stating that the Turkish government's position constituted an ultimatum. Nonetheless, Mavros asked for a thirty-six hour recess to consult with Athens, which the Turkish delegation rejected. No sooner had the Greek foreign minister completed his statement, Ankara's invading armies were once again on the move, extending their control over a greater portion of the island.

The new civilian regime in Athens met in an emergency session and, by all available accounts, contemplated declaring war on Turkey. However, after reviewing with the military chiefs the logistics of an operation in Cyprus and the armed forces state of preparedness, the Karamanlis cabinet abandoned the war option and instead concentrated on diplomatic efforts (Couloumbis, 1983:97). American and NATO failure to stop the Turkish advance forced the new government to withdraw Greece from the military wing of the Atlantic Alliance (Stern, 1977). Announcing the withdrawal, Prime Minister Karamanlis distinctly left the impression that Greece would not rejoin NATO until all occupation troops had vacated Cyprus. Some Greek public officials interviewed seemed to hint that in severing military ties with NATO, the new regime also sought to stop the flow of information from the Greek military command to the general command of NATO in which Greece is a member. The Karamanlis government apparently feared that remaining in the military wing of the alliance would compromise the country's ability to unleash a surprise attack against Turkey, should the latter become necessary.

Faced with the possibility of war and encouraged by those officers who had come to espouse the position that withdrawing and remaining in the barracks constituted the safest way to protect the military's long-range corporate interests, the government sought to improve the armed forces' state of preparedness. This included an increase in budgetary appropriations for defense (Table 1), the

purchase of new and more sophisticated equipment and supplies, and diversification of arms procurement sources—as opposed to relying on the United States as had been the case until then (Table 2).

In the domestic scene, the Karamanlis government moved swiftly to consolidate its precarious position. It scraped the Junta's draconian restrictions on speech, press, and other civil liberties; suspended the 1968 constitution, replac-

TABLE 1. GREEK MILITARY EXPENDITURES AS % OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>%</u>
1972	20.8
1973	21.7
1974	25.2
1975	28.5
1976	26.0

Source: The Military Balance, 1975-1976.  
London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975.

TABLE 2. GREECE'S ARMS SUPPLIES (in U.S. Dollars)

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>TOTAL VALUE</u>	<u>SUPPLIER</u>						
		U.S.	France	U.K.	G.F.R.	Italy	Canada	Other <sup>a</sup>
1964-1973	941	972	42	----	98	-----	-----	9
1974-1979	2,000	1,200	390	10	230	60	10	80

Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Washington, D.C. 1963-1973 and 1975-1979.

<sup>a</sup> not including Warsaw Pact nations



ing it on an interim basis with the 1952 one; dismissed civil servants that had openly collaborated with the military rulers; took steps to improve the country's sagging economy; and legalized the Communist party for the first time since the Civil War (1947–49). Finally, the national unity cabinet led the country to the polls four months following the fall of the Junta.

The November 1974 electoral contest, in terms of time and political climate, could not have been more advantageous to Karamanlis and his New Democracy party, which secured 54.4% of the votes (Penniman, 1981; Mouzelis, 1978). New Democracy essentially consisted (and continues to be) of the same pre-1967 political forces and personalities that had been the backbone of its predecessor, the National Radical Union (ERE) (Loulis, 1981; Featherstone, 1982:185; Lyrintzis, 1984:106). The fate of the monarchy was decided three weeks later in a plebiscite in which the Greek people overwhelmingly opted for a republican form of government. A new Gaullist-modelled constitution was passed through Parliament a few months later, completing the formal dismantlement of the praetorian regime (Diamandouros, 1984; Psomiades, 1982; Petras, 1977).

Responding to popular pressure, the government prosecuted the top leaders of the 1967 coup and the regime that emerged (Boulepsis and Rodakis, 1978). The upper crust of the military leadership was also replaced. But the government feared a possible backlash from within the armed forces and refused opposition demands for a more thorough purge of the armed forces and the civil service. In an effort to reassure the weary military, the government announced that their careers "shall be judged by their future behavior, not the past" (Washington Post, 1975a: A3). Thus, despite cosmetic changes, "little action was taken against the hard-core of officers who had been committed supporters of the dictatorship and who remained on active service" (Clogg, 1975: 340).

The possibility of war against Turkey in the months following the July disengagement, coupled with the desire to give the new civilian institutions a chance to receive a popular stamp of approval, and opposition within the armed forces led the Karamanlis government to reject opposition demands for *apohoun-topoiisis* (dejuntification). But pressure on the government mounted when more than half of New Democracy's Parliament members demanded "the immediate reinstatement of all officers dismissed by the Junta, and restoration of democratic order within the armed forces" (London Times, 1975a:6). The government responded by introducing a bill—unanimously approved in Parliament—designed to "speed up the procedures and to order the review of all military officers, regardless of qualifications" (London Times, 1975c:7).

Fearful that a purge was in the making, hard-line elements within the military sought to prevent it through a plot which the government uncovered and foiled on February 24, 1975. Announcing the folding of the conspiracy, Defense Minister Evangelos Averoff stated "that the plot involved foolish moves by a few unrepenting officers" linked to the dictatorial rulers (Washington Post, 1975a:A10). The conspiracy expedited the government's decision to proceed with the review process. But as it turned out, the February conspiracy was the fourth such attempt undertaken by certain officers since the July withdrawal.

Two explanations have emerged regarding the causes and goals of these



conspiracies. The first viewed the aims of the would-be coup-makers as limited in scope. As some officers argued, the plotters sought to bring pressure to bear on the government to grant general amnesty to all officers associated with the Junta; undertake no recrimination actions in the form of dismissals and purges against the armed forces; slow down or even reverse liberalization efforts, including the legalization of the Communist party; and take steps to assure the prestige and well-being of the officer corps. The second version saw all four abortive plots as a last-ditch effort by the hard-liners to regain power.

In either case, these plots constituted efforts on the part of certain elements within the military to influence developments in the country in ways that would be favorable to the armed forces corporate interests (Danopoulos, 1984). The government conceded that following the February plot five hundred officers were cashiered and six-eight hundred others were transferred to other posts (New York Times, 1975:27). These figures indicate that the number of officers involved was considerably higher than the "minimal faction" of less than one hundred reported by the government initially (London Times, 1975b:1).

Unlike the successful April 1967 coup, the 1974-75 conspiracies failed due to lack of support from within the military. In 1967 even those officers who did not play an active role in the coup accepted it as *fait accompli*. Such attitudes existed particularly among navy and air force officers. The post July 1974 "castrated" officer corps harbored different feelings. Interviews and other available evidence indicate that the majority of the military greeted disengagement with a sense of relief, for they perceived it as the only way to safeguard the future corporate interests of their institution. The burns were still too fresh for a replay of 1967. Besides, the military could no longer blame the country's problems on the political leadership as in 1967. If anything, the military in the period following disengagement were seen as the villain responsible for the nation's ills (Kourvetaris and Dobratz, 1981). Finally, seven years at the levers of political authority factionalized the once monolithic Greek military, rendering the chances of a successful intervention problematic.

In sum, the transition period from seven years of praetorian rule to civilian governance was accomplished by caution, determination, careful planning, and carrot and stick policies on the part of the civilian government. The majority of the military played their part in the process as well. Political power, with its failures, anxieties, and defeats, apparently taught the military that, at least for the time being, their corporate interests can best be defended by staying in the barracks.

### THE REMAINDER OF NEW DEMOCRACY'S YEARS

The failure of the February plot marked the end of the transition period. From this point on and throughout the Karamanlis years (1974-80), the military appeared prepared to carry out the orders of the civilian leadership and concentrate their efforts to perfecting their combat skills and preparedness. This state of affairs continued during the premiership of George Rallis (1980-81), who in May 1980 succeeded Karamanlis as prime minister and leader of the New Democracy party.

Both the officers corps and the civilians played a decisive role in maintaining this state of relative tranquility and normalcy in this period of modern Greece's



otherwise turbulent civil-military relations. A number of different and not necessarily coordinated factors account for each side's attitudes and actions. Let us identify and analyze these factors.

The failure of the Greek military as political governors convinced a significant number of officers to actively seek and support return to civilian rule. The folding of the February plot and the expulsion of the hard-liners that followed strengthened the position of those officers who had only reluctantly supported the Junta, or had come to accept the view that withdrawal to the barracks best guaranteed the protection of the military's corporate interests. Interviews with officers indicated that the Cyprus debacle and excesses and failures associated with military rule had tarnished the image of the armed forces, damaged their morale, and "castrated" the Greek military.

In addition, internal structural considerations played a part as well. The widespread purges carried out by the Junta against officers considered unreliable and insubordinate (fifteen hundred out of eleven thousand officers were cashiered in the initial stages of military rule) reduced the promotional bottleneck prevalent before 1967. For the most part, these forced retirements involved upper echelon officers. Their cashiering made possible the advancement of those in lower ranks affected by the slow hierarchical mobility.

If the military got their fingers burned and learned their lesson, so did the civilian leaders. The latter maintained a carrot and stick approach in their handling of the military in the post Junta days. On the one hand, Karamanlis and his associates punished the military by trying and jailing the ring leaders and their immediate supporters. On the other, the prime minister lost no time to commute the death sentences of the Junta leaders, as recommended by the special tribunal set up to try those responsible for the 1967 coup d'état, even before he had a chance to consult his cabinet. Moreover, the government proceeded to maintain and even increase the special benefits accorded to military officers, as special retirement allowances, medical care, and housing. The armed forces were also allowed to maintain their own radio station and to control one of the country's two television channels.

While the civilian government punished the leaders of the coup and forced the retirement of about five hundred hard-liners (out of fifteen thousand members in the officer corps), it stopped short of an outright purge. Instead, the Karamanlis/Rallis cabinets, out of necessity and/or ideological congruency, felt that those who had tacitly supported the military regime could be taught the virtues of democracy and civilian rule. In this regard, Karamanlis/Rallis and Defense Minister Averoff threatened and simultaneously cajoled potential coup-makers and praised the armed forces' patriotism and devotion to legality and the constitutional process. Defense Minister Averoff boasted: "I brainwashed them (military) extensively on the merit of democracy. I think there is not a single officer in front of whom I did not speak personally at least three times" (Washington Post, 1981:A16).

With regard to Greece's position in NATO, the Karamanlis/Rallis governments followed a carrot and stick approach as well. In the wake of Turkey's invasion of Cyprus and the organization's hands-off policy, the civilian regime was forced to suspend Greece's participation in the alliance's military wing and to declare that the country would remain out of it until the Cyprus problem was



justly dealt with (Rosenthal, 1982:121). To pacify the concerns of the armed forces, the Karamanlis/Rallis governments sought to sign arms procurement agreements with other Western nations such as France, Italy, and Germany. Similar agreements were concluded allowing Greek officers to receive advanced post-graduate training in those countries as well as in the United States. To underscore Greece's commitment to the West, the Conservatives sought and finally managed to link Greece with the European Economic Community (EEC), and ultimately reversed their previous stand by rejoining the military wing of NATO in the fall of 1980.

With regard to membership in the EEC, it should also be pointed out that the Conservatives felt that the principle of civilian supremacy, so widespread among the military of member states, would militate against possible intervention proclivities on the part of the officer corps (Couloumbis, 1981). Whether the Greek military exerted pressure on the civilian cabinets to rejoin NATO is difficult to ascertain. None of the officers interviewed, however, indicated opposition but instead seemed to welcome Greece's return to the Atlantic Alliance.

Last but not least, the lingering dispute with Turkey over Cyprus and the Aegean forced the Karamanlis/Rallis governments to maintain high defense appropriations. As Table 1 indicates, since 1975 nearly one-fifth of Greece's total budget is devoted to defense expenditures—a commitment shared by all political parties, including the Communists. Paradoxically, therefore, the Cyprus debacle, which hastened the Greek military's departure from the levers of authority, proved a blessing in disguise in the post-disengagement era. As a result, the armed forces' loss in prestige was outweighed by significant gains made in other areas.

### THE RISE OF PASOK

In the electoral contest of October 18, 1981, the voters dealt New Democracy a defeat, ending more than three decades of conservative rule. Instead, the Greek people opted for Andreas Papandreou's PASOK, giving it an overwhelming forty-eight percent of the votes cast (Lyrintzis, 1982; Diamandouros, 1984; Featherstone, 1983; Tsoulos, 1982; Mavrogordatos, 1982; Tsoucalas, 1982). Papandreou—the old nemesis of the Greek military—assumed the reins of government with a strong popular mandate for *allagi* (change). While in the opposition, Papandreou's positions had been quite different than those of Karamanlis. He held the United States and NATO as responsible for the military dictatorship in Greece and the Cyprus debacle. The PASOK Leader chastised the West for its pro-Turkish position, claiming that even though "we belong to NATO, this alliance [has] refused to guarantee our frontiers [against Turkish attack]" (Time, 1981:38). Finally, Papandreou declared that, with help from the Atlantic Community, Turkey and not the Soviet Union represents a threat to Greece's territorial integrity—a position he maintains to the present day.

In addition, Papandreou criticized Karamanlis and Defense Minister Averoff, maintaining that the dejuntafication of the armed forces they had undertaken had not gone far enough. He threatened that a PASOK government would withdraw Greece from NATO and would also dismantle all American bases on Greek soil. But as PASOK's popular appeal broadened, Papandreou steadily abandoned some of his more "radical" stands and instead sought to portray the



image of a pragmatic and responsible statesman ready to lead the country to new paths by bringing about badly needed economic, social, and administrative reforms (Featherstone, 1982; Couloumbis, 1981). Papandreou's and his associates' once critical attacks on the military moderated considerably claiming that the seven-year dictatorship "was a product of a small minority of officers which trapped the majority of the officers corps," and concluded praising the military's "total devotion to their duties: the preservation of national independence and protection of the country's democratic institutions" (PASOK, 1981:46).

Papandreou's actions as prime minister regarding the military, for the most part, have reflected his and PASOK's more moderate campaign statements and, to a considerable extent, resemble the carrot and stick policies of his predecessors. In an effort to reassure the weary military, the Socialist leader decided to assume personally the crucial defense portfolio. However, he lost little time to tell high-ranking officers representing all three services that "every Greek citizen has the right to his personal political opinion, but it is dangerous and impermissible for politics to intrude into the armed forces, who have only one mission, the sacred task of defending the nation" (Washington Post, 1981:A16).

The PASOK government has adopted a very nationalistic line with regard to Cyprus and the Aegean disputes with Turkey. Shortly after assuming office, the government decided to double Greece's assistance to Cyprus and stressed that Greece has a moral and a legal responsibility to protect Cyprus' independence and unity. The Greek government, declared Papandreou, "will undertake a crusade to mobilize world public opinion to help bring about a just solution to the Cyprus problem" (Eleftherotypia, 1981:1). These pronouncements were reaffirmed by subsequent statements, including those made during the prime minister's visit to Cyprus in 1982, the first such gesture by a Greek head of government.

Moral and legal diversions notwithstanding, the PASOK government's Cyprus policy is designed to touch the sensitive nationalistic attitudes that all military allegedly espouse (Abrahamsson, 1972; Nordlinger, 1977). It is also intended to make it difficult for the Greek armed forces to justify an intervention against a government struggling to preserve the country's national interests and pride. But the Greek prime minister also sought to remind and expose the military's past sins by planning to make public the documents surrounding the Cyprus debacle which previous governments refused to declassify. Yet, three years into PASOK's tenure in office, the Cyprus file remains largely unexposed.

With regard to other areas of contention with Turkey, the Papandreou government has taken equally nationalistic positions. In his first speech before Parliament as prime minister, the Greek leader declared that "our land, air, and sea borders as well as the boundaries of our Aegean continental shelf are fortified by international treaties, agreements, and practices and therefore are not negotiable" (Eleftherotypia, 1981:1)—a position different from New Democracy's willingness to settle these differences with Turkey through bilateral negotiations.

This stand, like the one regarding Cyprus, is also designed to rub on the armed forces' nationalistic feelings, and to create a climate that would force the military to be preoccupied with matters related to military preparedness for the



possibility of war with the perennial "enemy" to the east. At times, however, the PASOK government has shown willingness to settle these differences at the conference table, and a number of meetings involving officials of both sides have taken place to ameliorate the tensions between the two countries. An agreement to limit provocative acts for a year, known as "moratorium," was worked out between Ankara and Athens in 1982, indicating that pragmatism rather than rigidity is at the heart of PASOK's foreign policy objectives (Couloudakis, 1983; Larrabee, 1981-82).

In its dealings with NATO and Washington, the PASOK government has followed a policy of calculated ambivalence. On one hand, the government has been making critical remarks about the United States and the Atlantic Alliance, but on the other, continues to participate in NATO meetings and preparedness exercises and signed an agreement with Washington extending the presence of American bases in Greece for at least five more years. Thus, in spite of the fact that Athens has been much less inclined to support Western positions than in the past and has refused to support NATO's condemnation of the Soviet Union on such issues as the declaration of martial law in Poland and the downing of the Korean jetliner in 1973, in terms of foreign policy, Greece "has not left the Western European mainstream" (New York Times, 1984:1).

This policy of calculated ambivalence has been dictated by a number of important considerations. By taking some independent stands and engaging in anti-Atlantic rhetoric, the Papandreu government seeks to placate the more radical wing of its party as well as the traditional left both of which have been vocal critics of Greece's past role in the Western bloc. But at the same time, the PASOK government seems to feel that withdrawal from NATO may not be advantageous to Greece's present security considerations, especially in light of continuous disputes with Turkey (Axt, 1984:204-206). Last, but not least, the Socialist regime is also worried that any attempt toward withdrawal is almost certain to be met with stiff opposition from Greece's pro-NATO armed forces. In short, the Papandreu government seeks to diversify and broaden the country's foreign and security policies without provoking a backlash from the military.

To neutralize any possible military apprehensions that could be generated as a result of these moves, Papandreu and his associates worked out an agreement with their fellow Socialist government of France which calls for closer cooperation between the two countries in military-related matters. For Greece, this agreement is designed to enable the nation's military to continue receiving professional advice and training through their more advanced and Western affiliated French counterparts, reduce dependency on the U.S. and NATO by assuring Greece an alternative source for arms procurement, and prevent a military reaction that may occur in the event the United States and NATO decide to impose an arms embargo as a punitive measure against Papandreu's "recalcitrance." Concomitantly, the prime minister has promised to develop a domestic war industry by "transforming existing war-related industries from assembly and maintenance units to production units" (Eleftherotypia, 1981:1).

In other related areas, the PASOK government moved to recognize the positive and heroic role of the resistance forces against the Nazis, which had been downgraded and condemned by previous governments as Communist-inspired, and submitted legislation stripping the armed forces' control of a



significant portion of Greece's mass communication network. To compensate for these actions, the Socialists maintain the same high level of defense appropriations, and have attempted to diversify and improve the quality of arms, equipment, organization, and system of communications; and in an effort to reassure the armed forces, Papandreou apparently asked President Karamanlis—the constitutional commander-in-chief—to take a more visible role in military-related matters. Karamanlis, who enjoys the support of the military and has otherwise kept a low profile, has responded favorably to the government's call.

The government, carefully but decisively, has also taken steps designed to alter the internal power structure of the armed forces to hamper the ambitions of potential coup-makers. At the forefront of this effort has been the appointment of two navy officers consecutively to the sensitive post of Chairman of the General Staff of National Defense which, with one brief exception in the early 1960s, has been the exclusive domain of army generals. Although the government maintains that this is a matter of seniority, this move was a result of the navy's initial reluctance to take part in the 1967 coup and the less supportive posture it followed toward the military regime, exemplified by the unsuccessful revolt of May 1973. But beneath the surface one can argue that the Papandreou government also aims to break the army's first-among-equals role and instead to create three coequal services that would be independent from one another. The underlying thrust of this is to hinder dissatisfaction and possible interventionist motives among elements of one service from spreading and/or receiving the support of officers in the other two services.

To counteract possible apprehensions emanating from these moves, the PASOK government has offered a number of antidotes. Besides maintaining high level defense appropriations—which are bound to have a trickle-down effect on individual officers—the government pledged and is living up to its promise “to study and confront with concern the problems and living conditions of army personnel . . . and to provide every possible moral and material assistance particularly in matters concerning living and housing” (Eleftherotypia, 1981: 1). Moreover, the Socialist government announced its intention to “democratize” the armed forces. This is being pursued through the regular annual promotion and retirement of senior officers to ensure “the natural most advancement and promotion of officers in every hierarchical level” (Eleftherotypia, 1981: 1).

These moves aim to make room for younger officers divorced from the bitter civil war experiences that had left a distinct impact on the attitudes of their senior colleagues; and to prevent promotion freezes that could create disenchantment among those in the middle of the organizational hierarchy of the armed forces. Papandreou and his associates seem to be cognizant of the fact that most coups are led by middle level officers and appear prepared to take steps to prevent such an organizational bottleneck that may lead to disturbances. Finally, the government has taken some steps to reorganize the educational curriculum of military schools “to discourage the development of a climate conducive to any kind of totalitarian perceptions” (PASOK, 1981:46).

In its dealings with the military, the Socialist government, like its predecessor, seems to be pursuing carrot and stick policies, which emphasize both continuity and change. In short, the PASOK government seeks to bring about incremental



reform in the *ethnophronist* (nationally-minded) dominated Greek armed forces, without engaging in massive purges and wholesale dismissals, which could have been perceived by the military as an encroachment in their institution's autonomy and corporate goals.

How, then, have the Greek military responded to the Papandreou government's handling of matters related to the armed forces and their professional concerns? As during the Karamanalis/Rallis years, the trauma of the heptaetia and the Cyprus debacle continue haunting the armed forces. This feeling—plus the expulsion of the most vociferous hard-liners, the moderation of Papandreou's anti-establishment rhetoric, a willingness to guarantee the military's corporate interests, and the decision to leave the composition of the officers corps essentially intact—seems to have pacified the wary Greek army. Papandreou's cultivation of officers, particularly those at the lower levels of the hierarchy, before and after the 1981 elections, helped alleviate apprehensions prevalent among military officers. In general, therefore, the Greek armed forces greeted the ascent of the Socialists with a wait-and-see attitude. This, of course, contrasts sharply with the pre-1967 period when the military perceived the rise of the younger Papandreou as detrimental to the corporate interests and intervened to forestall the electoral victory of the Center Union Party in which Andreas Papandreou was a leading member (Danopoulos, 1980:ch.3).

The seemingly conciliatory and wait-and-see attitude displayed toward the Socialist government does not imply that the armed forces abandoned their prerogative to continue playing a major role in their nation's political affairs. To the contrary, their stand constitutes a rational and, under the circumstances, the most expedient posture. To the majority of officers, remaining in the barracks, as opposed to returning at the levers of political authority, constitutes—at least for the time being—the safest way to protect the military's professional interests.

However, two reported disturbances or abortive counter coups, involving certain elements in the armed forces, within the first two years provide evidence to suggest that the Greek military is out of power, but not altogether out of politics. The first disturbance took place on May 31, 1982, and the second on February 28, 1983. While the government dismissed both merely as "routine readiness exercises," the fact that they were followed by forced retirements of a number of suspected officers gives credence to the thesis that the Socialist government has been experiencing discipline difficulties in its ability to control the military.

Insofar as can be ascertained, both disturbances related to concerns on the part of many officers regarding what they perceived as an extensive Communist penetration of the state machinery since the Socialists' advent to power. In short, old grievances, ideological differences, and primarily professionally-related considerations have been responsible for creating relatively peaceful, but not altogether amicable, relations between the PASOK Socialist government and the Greek military.

### CONCLUSION

This article sought to identify and analyze the reasons post-Junta Greece, unlike the overwhelming majority of countries that have experienced military intervention, has so far managed to escape the general pattern of praetorian rule



which is normally followed by more of the same. The ten-year period since the 1974 disengagement was divided into three periods: the transition, the remainder of Conservative rule, and the first three years of the Papandreou Socialist regime.

The relevant data reveals that in all three periods a state of relative tranquility, but not an altogether amicable relationship, has characterized Greece's civil-military relations. Both the civilian and the armed forces played a decisive role in maintaining the military away from the levers of political authority. The civilians, having learned from past errors, have been pursuing carrot and stick policies aimed to safeguard the virtues of democracy and expose the military's past sins, but without damaging the social standing, prestige, organizational integrity, and corporate interests of the armed forces. Purges have been kept to a minimum and so has interference in promotional policies and other related professional concerns. Ironically, the unresolved Cyprus issues and the Greco-Turkish dispute over the Aegean have made it easier for the civilian cabinets to justify and rationalize their carrot and stick policies regarding the military.

The efforts of the civilian governments to neutralize interventionist tendencies have been directed at both the macro as well as the micro levels of military professionalism. Budgetary support, refusal to engage in widespread purges, and nationalistic stands constitute the most noticeable macro tenets. Changes in the curriculae of service academies, which have speeded up the advancement process, speeches praising the virtues of democracy and civilian rule, and improvement of the communication networks within the armed forces comprise the core of micro level adaptations. New Democracy cabinets tended to concentrate on macro level adaptations, whereas the PASOK government—perhaps out of necessity—has geared its efforts toward the macro as well as the micro levels.

The Greek officer corps, too, have played a decisive role in maintaining civilian rule in the country. The bitter lessons of the *heptaetia*, coupled with the weakening of the secret organizations within the armed forces and the ongoing strain in Greco-Turkish relations, have prevailed upon the armed forces to concentrate on morale and military preparedness. To a significant portion of the Greek officers corps, staying in the barracks seems the most logical avenue to protect the immediate and long-range corporate interests of their organization. Thus, the findings of this study are consistent with the argument that in countries that have experienced praetorianism, civilian rule is maintained by actions on the part of both the military and the civilian leadership.

Why, then, in the last decade have civil-military relations in Greece not fallen into the general pattern of military rule which is followed by more of the same? Did the Greek military and civilian leaders learn something their counterparts of other nations have consistently failed to do? A number of factors have contributed in making post-Junta Greece an exception to the general rule. The failures of the *heptaetia* and particularly the Cyprus debacle created an atmosphere not exactly conducive for another successful putsch, but forced the civilian successors to increase defense expenditures, acquire better and more sophisticated weapons, and to seek ways to improve the armed forces' morale and training. In balance, therefore, the Greek military are better off today than they have ever been (Veremis, 1980:107).



The inconsistencies and unreliableness of the Greek military as political governors may have taught NATO and the United States that supporting a repetition of 1967 is not in the best interests of the Atlantic Alliance. Dealing with civilians may be slower and more difficult, but safer and more predictable.

Post-disengagement political processes in Greece provide a sharp contrast with the pre-1967 period. The dividing presence of the monarchy has eclipsed. Political parties are better organized and more cohesive, with more clearly identifiable and better defined ideologies (Couloumbis and Yannis, 1983). Party switching, so widely practiced by politicians in pre-1967 days, and the acrimonious and raucous parliamentary sessions have given away to more stable majorities and more civilized and issue-oriented debates. Finally, Greece's association with the EEC, where the principle of civilian supremacy is well accepted and institutionalized among member states, militates against praetorian tendencies on the part of the nation's officers corps. Post-1974 developments, then, have made it problematic for the military to justify another intervention.

The theoretical conclusion that could be drawn from this study, therefore, is that the longevity of civilian rule in countries that have experienced praetorianism is directly linked to the state of political development and the experiences drawn by both the military and civilian leadership. The more politically developed a society, the less the chances that the aftermath of military rule would be followed by more of the same. The opposite may be true where development lags behind.

Does the past decade, then, indicate that the Greek military have withdrawn to the barracks altogether and have abandoned their pre-1974 attitudes to want to play a leading role in the country's political affairs? The events of the transition period and more recently during the first three years of the PASOK government—when a number of conspiracies were uncovered—exemplifies the reluctance of the Greek army to accept unconditionally civilian supremacy. However, as long as the Greco-Turkish disputes continue, Greek civilian cabinets have no choice but to maintain high levels of defense spending, military preparedness, and morale, which would go a long way toward satisfying the armed forces' corporate interests. Paradoxically, therefore, the state of crisis emanating from the differences with neighboring Turkey could provide sufficient time for Greek political institutions to develop further and acquire legitimacy. Likewise, it could give the nation's military the chance to internalize the principle of civilian supremacy and to develop the ability and/or willingness to protect their professional interests within the established political framework, rather than through intervention.

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